

ESSAY

Hando Runnel. Archival Record

This writing draws on a speech dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Estonian Association for Cultural Heritage Preservation. Its primary emphasis is devoted to remembering and the discovery, preservation and restoration of the past.

ARTICLES

Enn Küng. “This Fine City will become Deserted and Destitute”: Tallinn’s Economic Situation in the 1620s – 1630s. II

The second part of this article examines the use of the monies received from Tallinn’s customs duty rental in 1623–1629 (Table 2). According to the customs duty rental conditions, the rental income transferable to the state was composed of two parts: the rental amount itself, which amounted to 12,000 Swedish dalers annually, and the customs duties that had been received in excess of that amount, which the state split evenly with Tallinn. The latter was not a fixed amount, rather it depended on the customs duty income of each specific year. The state received a total of about 15,000 Swedish dalers, or more than 8,000 riksdalers, annually from Tallinn’s customs. Considering the customs duty income that Tallinn received, it is clear that the city’s own fiscal profit from the rental was not substantial. The Swedish state used the customs duty rental income it received mostly for financing the army and officials stationed in Estland, Livland and Ingria. Large sums went to Narva during the first years of customs duty rental. Later the monies received were for the most part placed at the disposal of Tallinn’s garrison, but they were also forwarded to Riga. The wages of local royal officials, like for instance Tallinn’s Vicegerent Evert Bremen, were also paid using customs duty rental money. It was also used to pay the skippers and crew members of ships chartered in the interests of the state for voyages to Narva and Riga. Grain purchases made on the king’s account were paid using customs duty income starting in 1627 (Table 3).

The monies received from Tallinn’s customs duty. The king used two measures for acquiring additional money from the provinces in the 1620s: first the extraordinary tax known as the contribution, which the state announced and for which it set the payment deadline. The money received was not paid back to the taxpayers. The second means was to take out loans from private individuals, which were paid back over the course of a certain period of time either in cash or in goods. Gustav II Adolf already demanded extraordinary taxes from Tallinn in 1612 and subsequent years, but as a rule these went unpaid or were paid only partially. Starting in 1625, the king imposed an annual contribution tax on the city – 10,000 Swedish dalers. Contributions were required from Tallinn until 1628 but the city did not pay that money in full in any one of those years (Table 4). On the one hand, the town council referred to the city’s historical privileges, which did not make provision for extraordinary taxes to the state, but on the other hand, the poverty of Tallinners and their inability to come up

with the required amounts were pointed out. In this situation, Gustav II Adolf decided in the summer of 1628 to start collecting a new sea toll in the roads of Tallinn – the licent toll – which in total yielded more than twice as much money to the state treasury than was hoped to receive from the contribution tax. In addition to the contribution tax, the state sought financial support through loans taken from private individuals, which grew to large amounts in the 1620s. Yet if we compare the amounts received from Tallinn and Estland to the financial resources sent from Sweden and Finland to Estland and Livland, then it turns out the contribution from Tallinn and the entire province to Sweden’s military budget was modest, minimally in the range of 5–6% (Table 5).

Peeter Kenkmann. “Universal Means of Governance”: the State of National Emergency in the Republic of Estonia in 1938–1940.

As we know, a nationwide or partial state of emergency was continuously in effect in Estonia since 1918, when it was vigorously applied solely against communists. In the summer of 1933, the government headed by Jaan Tõnisson imposed a temporary state of emergency in the city and county of Tartu in reference to the danger posed by the Estonian War of Independence veterans’ movement. This state of emergency was later extended to cover the entire country but it was implemented with moderation. The nationwide state of emergency was lifted in October of 1933 after the constitutional amendments initiated by the War of Independence veterans’ movement were approved by referendum and the Tõnisson government resigned.

Estonia’s Premier Konstantin Päts imposed a nationwide state of emergency once again after leading the coup d’état that began on 12 March 1934. This state of emergency remained in effect until the occupation and annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1940. In 1934, the extensive means of repression that proceeded from state of emergency legislation were implemented against all parties represented in parliament and members of the War of Independence veterans’ movement: this means that all political organisations were shut down and political meetings were prohibited, many members of the War of Independence veterans’ movement were arrested, and the press was subjected to governmental control.

On 11 April 1938, or just before the new 6th composition of the Riigikogu convened, Päts enacted a new State of Emergency Act as a decree in which the grounds for imposing a state of emergency were broadened compared to the legislation that had been in effect since 1930. According to the 1st section of the new legislation: “The aim of the state of emergency is to expedite the implementation of national defence and the defence of the country’s domestic security and public order.” All references to war or any other existential danger threatening Estonia’s system of government were removed from the legislation. Thus the imposition of a state of emergency was to a great extent made dependent upon the discretion of the president. In fact, the Ministry of Internal Affairs viewed the state of emergency primarily as a means for preserving domestic security and not for safeguarding national defence.

In 1938, the country's leadership also described the state of emergency as a universal means of governance, which was not meant only for emergency situations. Yet at the end of 1938 and over the first half of 1939, abandoning the state of emergency was hinted at if the possibilities for safeguarding national security without the state of emergency could be updated. The defeat of the Political Association Bill and the State Security and Public Order Bill in the Riigivolikogu (lower chamber of the Estonian Parliament), however, sent a clear signal that governance by way of the state of emergency would continue. President Päts extended the state of emergency again for another year in September of 1939.

The country's leadership presented two political arguments against terminating the state of emergency: one connected to domestic policy and the other to foreign policy. It was repeatedly noted as the argument regarding domestic policy that the implementation of the constitution that had taken effect on 1 January 1938 was still in progress. The people had not been "cured" yet, and the struggle in domestic politics that had preceded the coup of 1934 could conceivably resume. Regarding foreign policy, the tense international situation was referred to in 1938, and the outbreak of the Second World War was pointed to in 1939. Due to these factors, the leadership claimed that the government needed all possible means for safeguarding national security. It is questionable whether the implementation of the state of emergency as it was carried out in Estonia at the end of the 1930s actually helped to safeguard Estonia's security.

The authoritarian regime established by the coup d'état in 1934, which depended on the state of emergency to remain in power, was relatively mild in the European context because neither the opposition nor the masses put up any particularly active resistance. Both the so-called democratic opposition and the "red" opposition (consisting of socialists) demanded the abolition of the state of emergency and the restoration of democratic freedom. Yet at least the democratic opposition in the Riigivolikogu did not deny the need to impose a nationwide state of emergency in 1934 in order to exclude the members of the War of Independence veterans' movement from the political arena. Now their goal was limited to the restoration of the situation preceding the coup d'état. Yet in October of 1939, after the government cabinet headed by J. Uluots took office and relinquished the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs to A. Piip, one of the leaders of the democratic opposition, the democratic opposition also stopped actively demanding an end to the state of emergency, and the government did not issue a single promise concerning lifting the state of emergency.

Immediately upon taking power, the subsequent government headed by Johannes Vares, which was appointed to office under pressure from the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940, also started using the opportunities provided by the state of emergency that was already in force – now, in turn, to fortify its own power and to repress its political opponents, including both the prominent representatives of the former regime and the democratic opposition.

Not one piece of direct evidence has been found that would indicate that an end to the state of emergency and the restoration of democracy were being

planned in Estonia prior to 1940. This is because the state of emergency was not the last life buoy for the regime headed by Konstantin Päts to save it from the existential dangers that threatened Estonian statehood, but rather a "universal means of governance" to safeguard the power of that group.

Margus Maiste, Allan Puur. Registration of the Population in Estonia on 1 December 1941: Analysis of the Results

This article continues the analysis of the population registration conducted on 1 December 1941 in Estonia. Although the event was officially referred to as the registration of the population, it meets all the criteria of a census. While the previous article (published in *Tuna* 1/2017), dealt with the context and methodology, this article provides a systematic overview of the results. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first comprehensive account of the results of the 1941 census.

The authors address both the results published in contemporary statistical journals (*Statistische Monatshefte für den Generalbezirk Estland* and *Statistische Berichte für das Ostland*) and a variety of unpublished results from Estonian archives. An inventory of the unpublished census results is considered a major contribution of the article. Among other things, the article presents for the first time the detailed age structure of the population by single-year groups. The analysis of the census results is organised into six sections: population size, spatial distribution of the population, sex and age distribution, ethnicity and religion, branches of the economy and unemployment, and households.

In each section, the authors provide a comparison between the last pre-war census (1934) and the 1941 census. The comparisons reveal selectivity in the population losses that occurred in 1939–1941 in Estonia. The losses were more severe in urban areas and northern parts of the country where the Soviets had more time for mobilisation and evacuation. As a result, the share of urban population fell back to levels observed before the 1934 census. Across sex and age, the losses are largest among younger adults, particularly men. With regard to ethnicity, minority groups suffered proportionately larger losses than Estonians, especially Jews (deported and evacuated to the Soviet rear, killed during the German occupation) and Germans (resettled to Germany in 1939–1941). The evidence pertaining to economic characteristics indicates a temporary reversal of the trends in the economic structure (the share of the population obtaining livelihood from agriculture increased) and high levels of unemployment, particularly in urban areas.

Special attention was paid to the quality of the 1941 census data. The results of the analysis suggest that despite difficult conditions, the census results are fairly reliable. The estimation based on the number of live births registered during the 12-month period prior to the census suggests that the undercount was rather small (about 1%). A similar conclusion can be drawn from the comparison of the census results and the estimates of population losses (incl. resettlement of Germans, deportations, mobilisation, evacuation, war losses, etc.) that occurred in Estonia in 1939–1941.

The frequency of missing responses in the 1941 census does not exceed that of the previous census.

Peeter Kaasik. “Estonian boys, cross over! You’ll get a full stomach and home for Christmas!” On the Fate of the Men who Changed Sides at Velikije Luki

The course of fighting of the Red Army’s Estonian Rifle Corps in the Second World War was not exactly glorious, but the most had to be made of even this on the propaganda front. Thus the Battle of Velikije Luki was turned into a kind of cultic event in Soviet Estonia. Under the conditions of *glasnost* at the end of the 1980s, Estonians who had fought in the Red Army started being talked about publicly from a somewhat different angle. It was recognised that the Estonian Rifle Corps was essentially crushed at Velikije Luki, and a couple of thousand Estonians changed sides.

The Estonian Rifle Corps lost a total of over 16,000 soldiers at Velikije Luki who were killed, wounded, missing in action, taken prisoner or defected. The precise number of defectors is not known. The amount of defectors and soldiers taken prisoner is estimated at over 2,000. The main reason for changing sides was unwillingness to fight in the army of the occupying regime. Additionally, everyone remembered the repressions that were carried out in Estonia in 1940–1941. Their experience of Soviet reality in labour battalions and training camps, arrests and the disappearance into the unknown of their companions, hunger and misery, the Red Army’s tactics for waging warfare that did not care about human lives, and other such factors intensified the men’s repulsion and anger towards the Soviet Union even further.

Hundreds of men who changed sides crossing over the inner front line into the town of Velikije Luki fell into the hands of the Red Army after the town was captured. They were treated like traitors to their homeland and were tried by military tribunal. The tribunal sentenced a smaller portion of this group to execution by firing squad while most of the men were transferred to Red Army penal battalions, where the chances for survival were not much greater. The Estonians who changed sides crossing over the outer front line were gathered via distribution camps into the Polotsk transit camp. Most of them were sent to Estonia in the spring, where they were mostly released but with the requirement that they had to “voluntarily” join the German Army.

DOCUMENT AND COMMENTARY

Toomas Karjahärm. Three Anniversaries in 1987–1988. Historiographical Notes and Recollections II

Prior to the 70th Independence Day of the Republic of Estonia (24 February 1988), RIA Novosti held a round table discussion in Soviet Estonia on 11–12 February in Tallinn. It consisted of two theme blocks: 1) Socio-economic realities in the Baltic States in the era of capitalism and socialism: economy, culture, science; 2) The dynamics of ethnic relations in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The list of participants included a total of 33 foreign journalists from 12 countries who represented large and influential publications, and information

agencies such as CBS, Associated Press (AP).

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were represented at this form by delegations consisting of experts, mainly scholars in the humanities and cultural figures. Foreign journalists were particularly interested in political opposition, the rise of nationalism and dissidence, relations with Moscow. A large part of the discussion revolved around the demographic situation in the Baltic States, since the massive influx of Russian-speaking people in search of a better life had brought with it a critical decrease in the relative proportion of indigenous peoples in Estonia and Latvia.

The ESSR power elite started preparing early to prevent the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia. This issue was repeatedly debated in the Estonian Communist Party (hereinafter ECP) Central Committee. Verbose decisions were adopted “concerning the struggle against nationalism”.

On 19 February 1988, a letter from 48 people known to the public, mostly cultural figures, appeared in the newspapers, appealing to “maintain peace and dignity” and not to hold a demonstration that could lead to conflicts and provide wind for the sails of the diehard conservatives.

According to the secret plan drawn up in February of 1988 by the ESSR Minister of Internal Affairs, an operational group of several thousand men was formed in Tallinn for suppressing potential unrest. This force consisted of militia units (including reinforcements from Latvia and Leningrad), internal troops, and members of the people’s auxiliary militia.

The Estonian-oriented and reform-minded wing of the ECP Central Committee did not favour the use of force against demonstrators. Indrek Toome, the ECP Central Committee Ideology Secretary, and Enn-Arno Sillari, the 1st Secretary of the ECP Tallinn Municipal Committee, belonged to that wing.

A group of people was invited to speak with the people and to answer questions in two assembly halls in Tallinn’s city centre: humanities scholars (historians, sociologists), cultural figures and representatives of the municipal authorities. There was around 2,000 people.

There was a total of about 150 questions from the two halls. The topics were *glasnost* and democracy, Soviet repressions, the establishment of Estonian statehood and its destruction (occupation), symbols (the national colours and flag), national self-determination, Russification, the demographic catastrophe threatening Estonians, the fate of the Estonian language and culture, the economic crisis and self-sufficiency, and ecology (pollution of the human environment). It was asked why Estonia could not be a separate, independent country? Why is there no meat, sausages, coffee and other foodstuffs in the shops? These question and answer meetings, where a patriotic, Estonian-minded atmosphere prevailed, turned into events commemorating the 70th anniversary of independent Estonia thanks to both the people who attended them and the speakers.

Tiina-Mall Kreem. History in Pictures – the Picture in History

This article introduces the exhibition currently open at the Kumu Museum of Art entitled *History in Pictures*

– *the Picture in History* curated by Linda Kaljundi and Tiina-Mall Kreem, and the accompanying book that sums up five years of research on the picture of history in Estonia from the 16th to the 21st century. Pictures are used to demonstrate how folk mythology has on the one hand been a kind of history substitute for Estonians, yet on the other hand how in depicting folk heroes, Estonians have depended on Baltic Germans, from whom they have actually wanted to differentiate themselves culturally and politically. At the same time, the role of pictures and non-Estonians is pointed out in the development of the Estonian War of Independence into a national site of memory intertwined with the struggle for freedom fought by Estonians in ancient times. With reference to the coup d'état that was staged in June of 1940, the reliance of historical paintings on historical photographs is examined, along with the capacity of historical paintings to thereby amplify the meaning of events.

Estonian Film Archives: Do You Know this Land? Pärnu County

CULTURAL HISTORY ARCHIVES

Maarja Hollo. “To persist despite times, to sing despite times...”. Excerpts from the correspondence between Bernard Kangro and Salme Ekbaum

Both Bernard Kangro (1910–1994) and Salme Ekbaum (1912–1995) fled Estonia to seek refuge in Sweden in the autumn of 1944. Kangro stayed in Lund, whereas Ekbaum and her husband moved on to Canada in 1949, and settled down in Toronto. Both for Kangro and Ekbaum the exile years were creatively productive and their works enjoyed a wide readership. Ekbaum published her first novels at the Orto Publishing House managed by Andres Laur, yet started in 1955 publishing her works under the auspices of the Estonian Writers' Cooperative managed by Kangro. One of the motives to change the publishing house was her good relationship with Kangro. Kangro and Ekbaum are known to have met only once, at the congress of the PEN-club in the Estonian House in Stockholm, on May 26, 1978. The forty-two-year-long correspondence between these two writers, physically so distant, testifies to their spiritual closeness and long-term friendship. The correspondence was initiated by Kangro, who on May 20, 1950, wrote to Ekbaum, who had just become a member of the Estonian Writers' Union Abroad, with a request to contribute to a brand-new journal *Tulimuld* (Fire-Earth). We do not know what Ekbaum answered to him, as her first surviving letter to him dates back to June 1956. Ekbaum's letters to Kangro – forty-two in all – are preserved in the Estonian Cultural History Archives at the Estonian Literary Museum. Salme Ekbaum's personal collection in the archive of the Museum of Estonians Abroad in Toronto stores sixty-nine Kangro's letters. Kangro's first letter to Ekbaum dates from the spring of 1950 and the last one from December 1992. His letters speak about the birth and evolution of Estonian literary life in exile, providing a detailed and colourful overview of the establishment and operation of the two central institutions in diaspora Estonians' literary life – the journal *Tulimuld* and the Estonian Writers' Cooperative.

This makes these letters significant cultural-historical documents, which help to understand individuals' role and meaning in the existence and persistence of diaspora Estonians' literary life. Yet, Kangro and Ekbaum's correspondence is also an intimate document revealing the dynamics of the relationship between these two writers, which is also reflected in the changes in the addressing style in time. Ekbaum in her letters to Kangro discusses the latter's works, yet her letters also include more intimate contemplations and emotional confessions about the dark sides of life in exile. One of these confessions was initiated by writer Rudolf Sirge's visit to Toronto in September 1964.

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Eelco Runia. Spots of Time

How can the subliminal, mysterious, but uncommonly powerful living-on, the presence of the past be envisaged? In this essay, first published in English in 2006, Eelco Runia argues that presence is not brought about by stories – that is, by the “storiness” of stories. Instead, presence manifests itself in how the past can force us – and enable us – to rewrite our stories about ourselves. The question then is how we acquire the experiences that can eventually force us to do so. How, and with what kind of things, does the *mémoire involontaire* – from which presence wells up – get filled? In order to answer this question, one might turn it around and ask how we can fill the *mémoire involontaire* of others. A consideration of the “art of slandering” shows that the *mémoire involontaire* tends to be filled with things (1) that we believe are “common knowledge”, that (2) are “obliquely” communicated, and that (3) are cast in metonymies. Metonymy offers a much better road to the *mémoire involontaire* than metaphor because metonymy is better at suggesting that what it conveys is “common knowledge”. Therefore, Runia proposes that presence resides in the metonymical region of language. Instead of being contained in the meaningful content (the “storiness”) of stories, presence resides in what a story inadvertently has to be – that is, in the things a story has to present in order to present a story. Runia's conclusion is that as presence, the past is the exact opposite of what historians think it is. It is indestructible, uncannily close, and – despite its closeness and its durability – utterly impossible to conserve in “representations” that can be taken along in the hand luggage with which we traverse time.

Marek Tamm. Stories, Experiences and Presence: Interview with Eelco Runia

In this interview, Marek Tamm asks questions concerning some of the main developments and arguments in Eelco Runia's thinking about history. More specifically, the following topics are discussed: the intellectual and educational background of Runia's philosophy of history, relations between his philosophical and fictional work, his criticism of representationalism, his books written in Dutch, his sources of inspiration (Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Frank Ankersmit), the nature of his book *Moved by the Past*, and the aims of his new book project, entitled *Red Queen History*.